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1. Introduction
In free will discussion, "could have done otherwise"  is generally seen as a necessary condition for free
will  (List,2014;  Moore,1912;  Campbell,1951;  Hurley,  1999;  Gert  and  Duggan,1979;  List  and
Rabinowicz, 2014; Ayer, 1946; Moore, 1912; Davidson, 1973), and a classical way to make CHDO
compatible with determinism is conditional analysis of CHDO. Conditional analysis is first credited to
Moore  who  believe  that  CHDO actually  means  "I  should  have  done  otherwise  if  I  had  chosen".
(Moore, 1912)
In Kadri Vihvelin's paper "Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account", she has mentioned that the
conditional analysis of CHDO was considered a failure by many philosophers during 1970s (Vihvelin,
2004) and as far as I'm concerned, we haven't really seen that conditional analysis regained support
ever  since.  Donald  Davidson  believes  that  conditional  analysis  of  CHDO  cannot  be  properly
formulated (Davidson, 2001), and Berofsky also claimed that conidtional analysis of CHDO is a failure
(Berofsky, 2002);  most recently Christian List also argues that conditional interpretation of CHDO is
not successful (List, 2011). 
I  find  conditional  analysis  of  CHDO appealing  and  promising.  I  believe  it  does  capture  how we
normally  think  about  CHDO  and  I  also  think  that  it  is  quite  successful  in  making  CHDO  and
determinism compatible with each other. 
In my thesis, I'm going to defend conditional analysis of CHDO, to be specific, I'm going to defend
conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire. In a broader picture of free will discussion,
I’m taking a compatiblist position between free will and determinism.  
My thesis  is  that conditional interpretation of CHDO with an antecedent of desire is  a convincing
analysis that makes CHDO and determinism compatible with each other. I will support this thesis by
replying to some of the criticism against conditional analysis in general; discussing why the antecedent
3
of desire is a better candidate than the other antecedents and addressing some of problems against this
special version of conditional analysis of freedom. 
First, in the second chapter, I’m going to set up the background for my latter arguments in this thesis
paper. The third chapter introduces conditional analysis which is a compatibilist strategy that leads us
to  redefine  CHDO;  the  compatiblists  believe  that  this  strategy has  successfully  made  CHDO and
determinism compatible with each other. 
In the fourth chapter, I will consider different ways of formulating conditional analysis, namely, I will
talk about different kinds of antecedents the conditional analysts would posit.  I will further discuss
different problems to the different versions of conditional analysis. This chapter supports my thesis by
discussing  why  “desire”,  as  a  mental  state,  is  the  best  candidate  for  the  antecedent  part  of  the
conditional proposition. 
In chapter 5 and chapter 6, I will discuss some of the problems this special version of conditional
analysis faces. These problems include “substitution problem”(Berofsky, 2002), “freedom-undermining
situations” problem (List, 2011), “cases where the alternative action was not led to by the antecedent
desire” problem and “desire is not enough” criticism. The first two problems are also faced by other
versions of conditional analysis too, and I will demonstrate that these two problems are flawed and they
do not really undermine conditional analysis of CHDO. The other two problems require us to examine
carefully what conditional analysis of CHDO with antecedent is about, to be more precise, what the
original aims of conditional analysis of CHDO are and what the link from the antecedent “desire” to
the consequence “action” implies. 
I believe that once we have gotten clear on what conditional analysis of freedom presupposes but omits
in the formulation “I would have done otherwise if I had desired to”, these two last problems will also
be resolved. 
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The  discussion  in  these  two  chapters  will  show  that  conditional  analysis  of  CHDO  is  actually
convincing because it is immune to those problems we initially thought which would pose a threat to
conditional analysis of freedom. 
In  the  final  chapter  before  conclusion,  I  will  consider  one  more  criticism against  the  conditional
analysis with an antecedent of desire: the conditional analysis of CHDO has lowered the standard for
the compatibility between determinism and CHDO; the incompatibilists argue that we should insist that
“I could have done otherwise” means just “I could have done otherwise” (Hurley, 1999; Ginet,2002;
List,  2011).  I  think  this  criticism is  merely  a  criticism,  but  more  like  a  disputation  about  which
interpretation of CHDO to take. I shall consider two arguments in this chapter which shift the burdens
of proof to the incompatibilsits’s camp (Dennett, Taylor 2002; Lewis, 1981), that is to say, by the time
when incompatibilist finish reading my thesis, they have to find more convincing arguments to explain
to us why we should insist “I could have done otherwise” means just  “I could have done otherwise”.
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2. Could Have Done Otherwise and Determinism
In this chapter, I’m going to lay down the background for my latter arguments in this thesis paper. I’m
going to state what I take to be the definition of free will and I will say that CHDO is a necessary
condition  to  free  will.  I  will  briefly  describe  the  incompatibilists’  position,  who  believe  that
determinism has deprived one’s ability to do otherwise. 
1). The Definition of Free Will Used in this Paper
The big context of this thesis paper is in the discussion of free will, it is necessary to say something
about free will, and especially what kind of definition of free will I will use in my paper. 
Free will, taken the literal meaning, is freedom of willing, which is just something happens in the mind.
There’s no consensus on the definition of free will; some define free will as an ability to choose.
Vihvelin says that, “we believe that free will is or includes the ability to make choices on the basis of
reasons.” (Vihvelin, 2004: 1)
The process to choose mostly happens in our minds, so the ability to choose the agent has does not
guarantee the agent is able what he wants to do or chooses to do. I think to define free will just as an
ability to choose, which is sort of mental ability, is not enough to capture the sense of free will. 
First  of  all,  as  I  have observed in  my short  period of  writing  on free will,  “free  will”  represents
“freedom” in  philosophy,  and this  means  that  if  one  wants  to  know what  philosophers  say about
“freedom”, he would get the philosophical discussion of “free will”. For this reason that “free will” in
philosophy actually represents a lot of notions about freedom people have, I would think that free will
needs to cover something more than just the freedom of willing.  
Think about a case where the agent is locked and cannot do anything, intuitively, we would not think
that this person is free. This person may still have the freedom of willing, but certainly he lost his
freedom of action and we would not say that this person is free. Michael Pauen believes that “freedom
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of a person seems to result from the freedom of the actions she performs.” (Pauen, 2007: 2) He is
asserting that freedom of action is essential for one’s freedom.
I believe that free will should not only be understood as freedom of willing, but rather as freedom of
willing combining freedom of action. In other words, to say someone who has free will, this person has
to have the ability to carry out his action (and this action, clearly, is something he decides to do after his
own thinking) in addition to having the ability to choose. 
To have freedom of action as part of the definition of free will is important for my thesis paper, because
I’m mainly dealing with CHDO in my thesis; I’m analyzing the action that the agent actually did and
the action the agent could have done. So this “action” element is very strong in my paper.
For clarification, I assume “free will”, “to act with free will”, “to act freely” and also “freedom” as the
same thing in this particular paper. Also as a part of the framework of my thesis, I stipulate that to say
an agent has free will, he has to have the ability to do choose and also the ability to act according to his
own choice. 
2). Could Have Done Otherwise
In the free will discussion, CHDO is seen as a necessary condition to free will. It is usually held that a
person was  able  to  act  with  his  own free  will  only if  he  could  have  acted  otherwise. (List,2014;
Moore,1912; Campbell,1951; Hurley,1999; Gert and Duggan,1979; List and Rabinowicz, 2014)
For example, Ayer has claimed that “When I am said to have done something of my own free will it is
implied that I could have acted otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted
otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have done.” (Ayer, 1954: 110)
Similarly, Moore has also endorsed this requirement to treat CHDO as a necessary condition to free
will, 
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The statement that we have Free Will is certainly ordinarily understood to imply that we really sometimes have the
power of acting differently from the way in which we actually do act; and hence, if anybody tells us that we have Free
Will, while at the same time he means to deny that we ever have such a power, he is simply misleading us . (Moore,
1912: 1)
Donald  Davidson  has  also  put  it  more  straightforwardly,  “Freedom  means  the  existence  of
alternatives.” (Davidson, 1973: 73) When we say that we could have done otherwise, we mean that
there were alternative possibilities open to me at a given past time t – I could have done other things
except for the thing that I did at time t. 
If we could only do X1 at time t, or A was bound to do X at time t, for whatever freedom undermining
reasons2, we would not think A is free. To be free, the agent has to have the ability to do otherwise.
So what is CHDO? Previously, I have said that free will is an ability to choose plus the ability to act,
then as a necessary condition to free will. We should also think CHDO as an ability – an ability to bring
about the alternative action3. In fact, as I have observed, many philosophers do believe that CHDO
means the ability to do otherwise. 
Moreover, CHDO has to be a positive ability. By this I mean that CHDO is an ability that belongs to
human agents who can think for themselves and who are really in control of their actions4.  
Moore has brought our attention to the cases where CHDO is applied to inanimate objects. When
Moore talks about conditional analysis of CHDO5, he argues  that we cannot say that the ship could
have steamed twenty knots means that the ship should have steamed twenty knots if she had chosen,
1  X does not limit just one thing. At a given time t, the agent could do one thing, or a set of things. Whenever I talk about
2 There will be a further discussion on this freedom undermining situations in the first section of Chapter 5.
3 “Could” is the past tense of “can”, so apparently, CHDO is a past ability of the agent at current time. But it is more 
proper to say that CHDO is an ability of the agent which we, as theorists, can analyze at any given time. 
4 Here, I mean people are “in control of their actions” in a very normative and common sense – I’m washing dishes, then 
I’m in control of my action of washing dishes or Witold is writing, then Witold is in control of his action of writing. 
Some hard determinists would argue that given the truth of determinism, nobody is really in control of his action, 
because according to causal determinism, whatever the agent is doing is caused by previous action and his previous 
action was caused by its preceding action, then we can trace back to the time when the agent was born and there’s 
nothing that agent can do about the conditions he was given when he was born; in this sense, the agent is not really in 
control of his actions at current time, because ultimately he was not the creator of his own action at current time. I 
certainly do not mean “people in control of their actions” in this very strong sense.
5 The conditional analysis is the main thing in my paper, I did not mean to discuss it at this point. This passage I wrote 
here is mainly to stipulate the scope of the cases where CHDO could be applied in my thesis. 
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because the ship cannot move by herself,  instead, the correct way to analyze “the ship could have
steamed twenty knots” is “the ship would, if the men on board of her had chosen.” (Moore,1912) 
What Moore argues here is absolutely correct, the ship cannot move by herself and she cannot have the
positive ability to do otherwise as I just mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph. If we want to use
this kind of anthropomorphic expression to describe the ship and if we want to say that the ship has the
ability to move twenty knots, this ability the ship has is not a positive ability as mentioned earlier, but a
passive ability, which means that the ship was moved passively by men on the board. 
When I  talk  about  CHDO or  the  ability  to  do otherwise  in  my thesis,  I’m not  going to  consider
inanimate objects and the anthropomorphic way of using CHDO. I’m only going to discuss human
agents’ positive ability to do otherwise. 
3). Determinism’s Threat 
A group of philosophers called hard determinists, or as I refer to them simply as incomaptibilists6,
believe that determinism and free will are not compatible with each other – if we accept determinism, 
then the agents we talk about cannot have free will. According to incompatiblists, determinism implies
that the agent A was bound to do X, and not anything else at time t. If A was not able to do otherwise at
t, and CHDO is a necessary condition to free will, then under determinism, A did not have free will at t.
But first, what is determinism? To comprehend determinism is no easy task, some suggest that there are
at least ninety varieties of determinism. (Bishop, 2002) The notion of determinism I will use in my
thesis  is  very much simplified.   When talking  about  determinism,  I  will  focus  on  physical/causal
determinism, “the thesis that everything is determined to occur according to physical laws.” (Bishop,
2002: 111)  
6 Incompatibilists could also refer to a group of philosophers called libertarianism, who believe that free will exists, but 
determinism is to be rejected.
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One thing to note here is that I take a very simple think– then -act picture of action and I’m not getting
into the philosophical discussion of action theory about how people act in my thesis.
According to determinism, our actions and our thoughts7 are caused by their preceding actions and
thoughts, and these actions and thoughts were caused by further preceding actions and thoughts, if we
follow this line of thinking, finally we will trace back to the time when we were born and find out that
our current actions and thoughts ultimately are derived from the conditions we were given when we
were born. Therefore, determinism is the doctrine that our current states of affairs (actions/ thoughts /
combination of actions and thoughts) are determined to occur given the deterministic natural law and
the fixed conditions at the time when we were born. 
Now, as Ayer expresses, “if human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how
any action that is done could ever have been avoided.” (Ayer,1946: 117) Incompatiblists believe that
free will and determinism are incompatible with each other because CHDO and determinism cannot
coexist.  So next question is, how determinism has posed a threat to CHDO? 
My explanation is as follows. The choice we have made at a given time t is caused by our thoughts at
this  time t  which are caused by our previous  thoughts at  an earlier  time t0;  then we find that our
thoughts at time t0 are also influenced by our thoughts at even earlier times. We will then track back till
the time when we were born, and find that our choice at time t is actually determined by the things we
were given when we were born. 
Now, if we think of this causal chain of thoughts and actions, or simply, one’s life history (from the
time when the agent was born to the time t when he did the action we are analyzing) as a tape, given
the conditions we were given when we were born and which we cannot do anything about, then this
tape would lead to the action8 at t which we are analyzing, not any other action. Therefore, given the
7 Here “thoughts” do not refer to “random thoughts” we have, but rather the thoughts we have when we are going 
through some cognitive process before we make our decisions about what we do.
8 Of course, this could be thought of as a set of actions, or some thoughts the agent had at a given time t, or simply states 
of affairs at time t. 
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truth of one’s life history from the time when he was born to the time t when he did the action in
question and determinism, alternative possibility is not possible for the agent. 
If we9 could not have done otherwise and as CHDO is a necessary condition for free will, then under
determinism,  we  cannot  have  free  will.  Such  is  the  position  of  incompatibilists,  who  embraces
determinism and believes that we cannot have free will when there’s determinism10. 
9 Sometimes in my paper, “we” refer to the agents we are talking about, and sometime “we” refer to the theorists who are
analyzing the agents – whether the agents have free will or not. Here “we” refer to the agents in question. But generally 
in my thesis, “we” could refer to the ones being analyzed or to the ones who are analyzing whether some agents have 
free will or not. 
10  Let’s treat determinism in this discussion as a stipulation, rather than a theory. This means that I will ignore all the 
counter-argument against determinism itself. For example, some scientific findings which suggest that the universe is 
not deterministic, rather it is indeterministic. (Bagini,2015; Libet, 2002; Bishop, 2002; Kane,2002) I will just not 
consider these arguments concerning indeterminism and its implications. (Hodgson, 2002; O’Connor,2002; Dennett, 
2016)
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3. Conditional Analysis
Compatibilists believe that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive with each other. 
One of the ways to reply to the incompatibility problem that I’ve talked about is to reassess CHDO, and
compatibilists offer us the conditional analysis of CHDO. In this chapter, I will introduce the general
conditional interpretation of CHDO and explains why conditional analysis of CHDO can make CHDO
and determinism compatible with each other.   
Unlike  incompatibilists  who  think  that  determinism posed  a  threat  to  the  existence  of  free  will,
compatibilists believe that determinism and free will can be compatible with each other. Needless to
say, they also believe that CHDO is compatible with determinism. So how do compatibilists reach this
position – the compatiblity of CHDO and determinism? The compatibilists invite us to reassess CHDO,
namely, what we really mean when we say that we could have done otherwise.
Traditionally11, compatibilists contend that when we utter the sentence “I could have done otherwise”,
we do not just mean I could have done otherwise, what we really mean is that I would have done
otherwise if I had desired to12.(List, 2014; Baggini,2015) 
11. Christian List has actually called this reading of CHDO the “traditional conditional interpretation” of the ability to do 
otherwise. (List, 2014)
12. Conditional analysis is not the only way for we to reassess CHDO. For example, J.J.C. Smart has differentiated CHDO 
in the special sense and CHDO in the normal sense. According to Smart, “there is perhaps a sense of ‘could not have done 
otherwise’ in which whether or not a person could or could not have done otherwise depends on whether or not the universe 
is deterministic...But it does not follow that if a person could not have done otherwise in this special sense then he could not
have done otherwise in any ordinary sense.” (J.J C Smart, 1963) CHDO in the special sense is the CHDO that is dependent 
on whether we endorse determinism or not, and it is without any conditional add-on. On the other hand, CHDO in the 
normal sense is not affected by determinism, although this CHDO is not necessarily the same as the conditional analysis 
reading of CHDO.
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For example, Moore is also said to be one of the first philosophers who have offered us a conditional
analysis of CHDO, according to Moore, CHDO is a convenient substitution of the whole phrase “he
should have done otherwise if he had desired to.” (Moore, 1912)
Compatibilistis believe that conditional analysis has captured the normative sense of could have done
otherwise (Baggini,2015); we are interested in alternative possibility only when we have a desire to do
something else other than the thing we do at time t. If we did not have such a desire to do differently,
and if the thing we did at  time t  is the only thing that we wanted to do, according to conditional
analysts, we really do not care if we could have done otherwise or not. 
To illustrate, here’s a simple example: at a given past time t, I was drinking pure water. I wanted to
drink it at this given time t, because I was thirsty and I wanted the clean feeling I would get of drinking
pure water. According to the hypothetical analysis of CHDO, I could have done otherwise, means “I
would have drank coffee, if I had the desire of drinking coffee”; this desire of drinking coffee may
come from the fact I was really tired at time t and I needed the caffeine to make myself feel more
energized or I was just really craving for a cup of coffee. But since at t, I was not tired and I did not
really crave for coffee, I would not choose to drink coffee. “I could have drank coffee”, as understood
as “I would have drank coffee if I had desired to drink coffee” does not matter to me or my freedom.
Let me continue answering this question about how this move of redefining CHDO has made CHDO
compatible with determinism. Determinism entails that at time t, the agent A was bound to do certain
action X given the truth of the past and deterministic natural law. Apparently, A could not have done
otherwise.
Conditional analysts have modified “A could have done otherwise at time t” into “A would have done
otherwise at time t if A had desired to”. Recall, one of the premises for the conclusion that A was bound
to do X at current time t is the truth of the past, or one’s life history, to be more specific, the desire that
A had at an earlier time t0 led him to carry out the action X at time t. But the unrealized alternative
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event was led to by a different desire at an earlier time t0, so if we have replaced the original desire
(which leads to X at current time t), as the conditional analysts have suggested, with a different desire
at time t0, then we have denied one of the premises for the unalterability of the current state of affair,
then the conclusion that A could only do X at time t does not hold anymore.
Now critics may have one quick question, that is, the different desire the alternative action requires is
not available to the agents given the truth of determinism, if the antecedent “desire” is not available to
the agents, how could the agent be able to do the alternative action, since this alternative action was led
to by a different desire, therefore, under conditional analysis, the agent could not have done otherwise.
But if conditional analysts want to say that under determinism, the agent actually could have done
otherwise, this seems to indicate that their strategy actually does not work. 
I  argue that  whether  the different  “desire” is  available  to  the agent  or  not,  conditional  analysis  is
successful in making CHDO and determinism compatible with each other. This does not mean that
conditional analysis does not suffer other problems, which I will discuss in great detail later, but at this
point, to reply to this question that the critics have, I would say conditional analysis works.
So how? Previously, I have said that a different desire at a prior time t, would require the history of
one’s life history be modified. 
Now suppose that the desire was not available to us, maybe the critics would argue because we cannot
change the history we had, then it seems that we could not have done otherwise. But this does not
affect conditional analysis, because according to conditional analysis, “I could have done otherwise”
means “I would have done otherwise if I had desired to”; the alternative action I would have done was
led to by a different desire, in other words, I would have done a different action Xa only if I had wanted
to do Xa. If a different desire was not available to me, this means that I did not want to do Xa, and if I
did not want to do the alternative action, why would I want to do it? I would not care if I could have
done otherwise or not. According to the conditional analysis, an alternative action at time t was led to
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by a different desire the agent did not possess in the first place and had the agent A possessed the desire
to do differently, he would do it, he just did not have the desire. This interpretation of CHDO and
determinism can go hand in hand. 
On the  other  hand,  I  would  have  done  otherwise  if  the  different  desire  which  would  lead  to  the
alternative action was actually available to me. If we think of my biography that led to my action X at
time t as a tape under determinism, an alternative consequence would require us to look at a slightly
different tape13, call it “tape1”. Under determinism, if we only have this one original tape to look at,
which is the linear being the agent A is living, A could not have done otherwise because A did not have
another desire in the first place. But if we look at tape1, we find out that A has done something different
at time t which was caused by a different desire at an earlier time to  on tape1. Both tape and tape1  can
coexist and both were written according to deterministic law14.
Of course, the antecedent part of the proposition does not limit to “if I had desired to.” It could also be
“if I had tried to”, “if I had wanted to” or “if I had intended to”. Clarke has made this strategy more
clear and general to us, 
One classic compatibilist line – a view on which having free will requires being able to act otherwise, and having that
ability is  compatible  with determinism – takes  abilities  to  act  to  be dispositions  or  causal  powers,  and offers  a
conditional analysis of the latter. To be able to perform an action of A-ing, it is said, is to have a disposition or power
to A. And something has a certain disposition or power if and only if a certain simple condition is true of that thing.
(Clarke, 2009: 323)
13 This different tape, call it tape1, contains a different desire at time t0  which would lead to a different state of affair at 
time t. I call it slightly different from the current tape we have, because I do not want the readers to think that this tape 
is so massively different from our actual tape, we may only need to make a few alterations to our actual tape to get this 
different tape1. The matter is that we need a different desire which would lead to an alternative action at t which we 
would not find in our current tape under determinism, so we need to take into consideration an another tape. A similar 
discussion will be taken up again in Chapter 7 where I discuss the incompatiblists’ criticism that conditional 
interpretation of CHDO is a watered-down version of CHDO. 
14 Of course, this claim is open to disputation, some may argue that we can only have this one actual tape to look at. If this
is the case, then we go back to the situation where the different desire was not available to me; even under these types 
of circumstances, the agent could have done otherwise according to conditional analysis. 
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The more general picture is to posit an antecedent condition which will lead to the occurrence of an
alternative action but which the agent needed to fulfill first. This condition could be a different desire
or a different action.15
Conditional analysis seems to have offered us a way to make CHDO and determinism compatible with
each other, but it is actually a position that has faced quite a few criticism, we will consider some of the
criticism conditional analysis faces in the following chapters.
15 Ayer is one of the first philosophers to have invented conditional analysis of CHDO. His conditional analysis of CHDO 
is in the format of “attempt” – I would have done otherwise if I had chosen to. 
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4. Antecedent Part of Conditional Analysis of CHDO
There are couple of different ways to and make a conditional analysis of CHDO. In this chapter, I will
consider  different  ways  of  formulating  conditional  analysis  and  discuss  different  problems  to  the
different versions of conditional analysis. I will conclude that “desire” as a mental state is the  best
candidate for the antecedent part of the conditional proposition. 
1). Antecedent Is Not Enough
As mentioned above, CHDO is the ability to do otherwise. The antecedent of proposition would have to
guarantee  the  occurrence  of  the  consequence  of  the  proposition  if  the  proposition  is  a  legitimate
analysis of the ability to do otherwise. So the conditional analysis of CHDO has to capture the fact that
CHDO is an ability. This leads to a question regarding the conditional analysis – what we should put
into the antecedent part of the conditional proposition to best capture that CHDO is a positive ability to
do otherwise?
Let’s take the conditional analysis in the format of desire as an example and analyze this version of
conditional analysis. In previous section, I have used phrases like “a different desire the agent had at an
earlier time would lead to an alternative action”, which suggests that there’s a causal link between one’s
desire and one’s action.
Some authors have challenged this link between desire to actions. They argue that desire is not enough
for actions – if we would like to say that the desire leads to the action, not only the agent has the desire
to do something X, the agent also has to have the corresponding ability and luck to bring X about.
When compatibilists say that “I would have done otherwise if I had desired to”, they seem to ignore
 some other factors which lead to an action, for example, effort, skills or luck. It’s as if they think that
when people have a desire to do X, and then X would automatically obtain. We know that this is not the
case, and we cannot simply add the antecedent part in the format of desire and assume it will lead to a
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different consequence. Moreover, the desire does not really mean that the agent has the will to make an
effort to bring about the action. Even the agent desires something, he may not decide to act upon it.
Based on this worry that even though the agent has the desire to do X, he may not take action and he
may not act upon it, some of the compatibilists try to improve the situation by offering an account of
conditional analysis in terms of attempt – “the agent would have done otherwise if he had tried to.”
(Ayer, 1954; List, 2011) 
This version of conditional analysis suffers similar problems, namely, the antecedent condition does not
seem to be adequate leading to the alternative action – even if the agent had tried to do X, it does not
mean that he has the corresponding ability or the external conditions needed for the occurrence of the
alternative  event  are  available.  For  example,  someone  who  has  been  eliminated  during  a  singing
competition and who does not have any singing skills may very well claim that he would have won the
competition if he had tried. It is very clear that “would have done otherwise if one tried” in this case
fails.  When the  agent  does  not  have  the  ability/talent16,  it  is  impossible  for  him to bring  about  a
different outcome which relies on this ability. The guy who does not have any singing skills is bound to
be kicked out of the competition no matter what. At the same time, if this guy has a cold that day and
cannot sing, he cannot win the competition either,  so in order to win the competition,  besides the
possession of the singing skills, the guy needs to have luck too, namely, some other external conditions
supporting him to use his talent. 
2). Infinite Regress Problem
16. This means the ability within the ability to do otherwise, not to be confused with the ability to do otherwise itself. 
I will call this kind of ability “type ability”, and this concept of “type ability” is similar to the talent the agent 
possessed. I will discuss this concept in detail in “Chapter 6. How To Think of CHDO”. 
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Some compatibilists are trying to improve the situation by further modifying the conditional analysis in
terms  of  attempt,  they believe  that  we should  understand CHDO as  “the  agent  would  have  done
otherwise if he had tried to do and succeeded.” 
This method seems to have solved the problem of “not genuine” – the antecedent of the proposition
itself is not enough to bring about the consequence. Because if the agent had tried to do something and
succeed,  then  we  would  think  that  this  different  action  would  take  place  and  the  link  from the
antecedent to the consequent is unbreakable.
However, this method suffers the problem of the infinite regress problem. When we say that A would
do X if he does something first, we would then ask the question whether he is free to do the antecedent
part or not. If the question whether the agent is free doing the antecedent action of the proposition
remains, then the conditional analysis of freedom just would not work.
According to this version of conditional analysis, the alternative action, name it XA, comes from the
agent’s attempt, and this suggests that the agent’s action is based upon the agent’s previous action, for
attempt is itself an action. Then we can think that this agent’s previous action is further caused by
action at even earlier time. If we keep tracing back, we will arrive at a time when the agent was just
born, and he cannot control these conditions given to him when he was just born. So ultimately, he is
not the creator of his action XA.
It is obviously we can see here that, any conditional analysis with an antecedent of an action sort, is
subject to the infinite regress problem, because we would have the alternative action caused by its
previous action which was in turn caused by further previous action, and this causal chain is the ground
for infinite regress problem. 
The matter here is that if one cannot be the originator of his action, he cannot be said to be free, and
conditional analysis in the first place is to make free will and determinism compatible with each other,
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so conditional analysis in the format of “the agent would have done otherwise if he had tried to do and
succeeded” fails.
One might reply that the ability to do otherwise and the ability to be the originator of one’s action are
not  the same.  Generally,  both the power to  be the originator of one’s  action and the power to do
otherwise are seen as necessary conditions to free will, and they are not entirely the same (Pauen, 2007;
Baggini, 2015) 
Let’s think of one’s biography as a straight vertical tape from the point when he was born till the time t.
According to conditional analysis with an antecedent of an action sort, one’s action at time t was caused
by some previous action of the agent at time t0, and if we think of these two actions at different times as
two spots on the tape, then the power to create is about one spot moving vertically to another spot; 
then metaphorically speaking, we can think of the power to create as being vertical.
On the other hand, the power to do otherwise should be seen as horizontal. As said earlier, the different
desire the agent had at a prior time t0 which would lead to the alternative action, requires us to look at a
slightly different tape1  and when we ask the question “could the agent do otherwise at time t”, we are
comparing the actual tape we are living and the tape1  where the alternative action took place – more
specifically, we are looking at two actions at time t, one actual and one hypothetical, on two different
tapes. Now if we think of the two actions at time t as two spots on these two tapes and draw a line to
connect them, clearly, this line is horizontal if we think of the tape as being vertical. 
This illustration may be a good way to show that the power to be the originator of one’s action and the
power  to  do  otherwise  are  two different  properties  which  the  agent  possesses  and we should  not
conflate the two. The infinite regress problem is an argument against the power to be the originator of
one’s action so it does not really affect whether the agent has the power to do otherwise or not.
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I think that this reply is not convincing enough. This reply is saying that the power to create and the
power to do otherwise should be separated, and the infinite regress problem has posed a threat only to
the power to create; the power to do otherwise, which we care about, is actually not affected.
Clearly, this is not the case. As infinite regress problem has shown us, the power to create and the
power to do otherwise are indeed connected with each other, and power to do otherwise is affected by
the “vertical” infinite regress problem.
Once again, conditional analysis with an antecedent of attempt claims that alternative action would
have taken place if (but not only if) the agent had done some other action before and this assumes a
causal chain between actions; if we follow this causal chain, then we will trace back till the time when
the agent was born and the conditions given to the agent when he was born were not within his control
– the agent was not the ultimate creator of the alternative action in question. 
Infinite regress problem says that the agent could not have done otherwise X under this version of
conditional analysis because the alternative action X was ultimately not created by the agent. The reply
fails to address the connection between the power to do otherwise and the power to create.
I claim that I do not how to solve this infinite regress problem, and I say that conditional analysis of
CHDO with an antecedent of an action sort is not a successful analysis of freedom.  
3). Attempt is Part of the Action
Let’s consider another problem for the conditional analysis with an antecedent of an action sort (trying,
choosing). This problem is that apparently the antecedent of an action sort is part of the alternative
action in question. Donald Davidson believes that the antecedent condition should be prior and separate
from the action; he believes that choosing or trying is part of the action itself, and now we are trying to
find a different prior cause for the alternative action that we are analyzing, if the antecedent is part of
the alternative action, it cannot be said to be a proper cause for the alternative action. (Davidson,  2002)
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For example, consider the proposition “Lena could have raised her arm if she had tried”; it seems
strange to say that someone is trying to raise her arm, because when Lena is trying to raise her arms,
isn’t she already raising her arm? 
In the case of choosing, if we interpret choosing as an action – if we think of choosing as something
that is not just something taking place in one’s mind, but actual action of choosing, then it seems that
choosing is part  of the action that one chooses to do.  Think about a very simple case: Adam was
thinking whether he eats an apple or orange, and there is an apple and orange in front of him. When he
is choosing to eat the apple, we can think that he is already going ahead to grab the apple and then
starts eating it; the action of choosing, grabbing the apple and eating it seems so closely connect and we
can say that they are parts of one single action. 
I think this observation here shows us that it is quite difficult to draw a line between the cause and the
consequent if we think of the antecedent as an action. But the conditional analysts want to say that the
satisfaction of a preceding condition would guarantee the occurrence of the alternative action, so the
condition and consequence need to be separated. I argue that because the antecedent of an action sort
can very easily be seen as part of the consequent action, the antecedent of attempting or choosing is not
a very good candidate for the antecedent part of the conditional proposition. 
4). Antecedent of “Desire” Has Edges Over the Antecedent of “Attempt”
Desire, not as an action, but as a mental state comes into our mind again. The antecedent “desire” is
immune to the problem we just talked about: “desire” clearly is not part of the action, and it can be seen
as a cause to one’s action. 
One immediate criticism would be that desire is not in the agent’s control, and if we say that desire is
the cause of the action, then the action comes from something that the agent is not free to do, does this
make the agent unfree to do the action?
22
My response would be as follows: the fact that the desire is not in the agent’s control has nothing to do
with whether he is free or not, because having desire, impulse or even belief is what constitutes an
agent – it is part of being an agent so to speak; our free will works when we are thinking whether we
act upon our desires or not. As Davidson puts it,  “the question how he acquired them (desires and
beliefs) are irrelevant to questions of how free his actions are.” (Davidons, 2002: 72) Davidson has also
reiterated the important point here, “the point isn’t that desires and beliefs aren’t ever in an agent’s
control, but rather that coming to have them isn’t something an agent does.”  (Davidson, 2002: 72)
Desire is not an action the agent does, and it is a mental state that the agent has which can be seen as a
cause for an action that the agent does latter. 
What  Davidson  said  here  can  also  be  used  to  refute  the  infinite  regress  problem  regarding  the
conditional analysis with an antecedent of desire. Some people treat “desire” as a verb and read it as
“enter a mental state”, then the conditional analysis with an antecedent of desire seems to also suffer
the infinite regress problem I have discussed earlier, but as Davidson suggests, the agent does not have
to do anything to have a desire and desire itself should not be seen as an action of the agent, this
understanding of desire has resolved the infinite regress problem. To make it more clear, the antecedent
“desire” is a mental state, not an action, so it does not depend on previous action as the infinite regress
problem suggests.  On the other  hand, unlike the antecedent “action”,  which obviously depends on
previous  “action”,  the  antecedent  “desire”  does  not  dependent  on  previous  “desire”  or  any other
obvious  conditions;  according to Davidson (I  agree with Davidson’s insight),  having desire  is  one
aspect of being a human agent – as human agents, desires would just come to us, and there’s nothing
we can do about it, what we can do is use our free will to decide whether we act upon it or not. 
To conclude,  this  chapter  mainly discusses  about  what  kind  of  antecedent  we should take  for  the
conditional analysis of CHDO. To do this, I have considered several problems against different versions
of conditional analysis. First, I argued that the antecedent of desire or attempt does not seem to be
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adequate leading to the consequence. Then, if we try to find a perfect link between the antecedent and
the action and say that the agent would have done otherwise if he had attempted and succeeded, then
this version of conditional analysis  suffers the infinite regress problem, which actually renders the
agent unfree; I also pointed out that conditional analysis with an antecedent of action sort in general
suffers the infinite regress problem. 
One further problem against the conditional analysis with an antecedent of an action kind is that the
attempt seems to be part of the action itself, and if we want to give a conditional analysis of freedom,
the antecedent needs to be the cause of the action. The antecedent of desire, which is a mental state, is
immune to this problem and the infinite regress problem. 
However, I haven’t addressed the first problem raised in this chapter, that is, “desire” is not enough to
cause the consequence, there seems to be other conditions needed too. I will discuss this problem in
detail in chapter 6. 
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5.  Difficulty Regarding Conditional Analysis of Freedom with An Antecedent of Desire
Now I have argued that the antecedent of desire has more edges than the other antecedents, to say that
it is a convincing argument, we have to consider the problems it face and reply to them.
As the conditional analysis with an antecedent of desire, which I’m going to defend, is just one special
version of conditional analysis, whatever problems the general version of conditional analysis face, the
conditional analysis with an antecedent of desire faces too. 
In this chapter, I will first consider criticism against conditional analysis in general. I will then consider
more specific problems against this special version of conditional analysis of CHDO I’m defending. 
1). Criticism Against General Version of Conditional Analysis
Just  to  be  clear,  the  general  version  of  conditional  analysis  refers  to  conditional  analysis  with  an
antecedent that is yet to be specified. If the general version of conditional analysis suffers the problems
listed below, then the conditional analysis with an antecedent of desire has to deal with them too in
order to be considered as a convincing argument. 
– Substitution Problem
In an essay called “Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues” in Oxford Handbook of Free Will by Robert
Kane, Berofsky17 has restated Lehrer’s argument which shows that conditional analysis of the ability to
do otherwise is inadequate to capture the sense of CHDO is an ability (Berofsky, 2002).  Berofsky
shows us a traid, 
“if C, then A X’s
Not -C
If not-C, then A cannot X” (Berofsky, 2002: 191)
17 Berofsky said that this argument comes from Keith Lehrer; I had a hard time tracing the original passage talking about 
the argument and I was unable to do so. So I quote this passage as a secondary literature here.
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The  crucial  point  is  that  these  three  propositions  are  compatible  with  each  other,  but  if  the  first
proposition means “A can X”, as conditional analysts would claim, then the first proposition and the
last proposition contradict with each other.
This argument aims to show that conditional analysis of CHDO cannot equal to the claim “A can X”. 
Before replying to this “substitution problem”, I have to clarify two points about the argument. So
everyone knows what we are talking about here. 
One may notice that “If not-C, then A cannot X” is not necessarily plausible; we certainly should not
assume “Not-C” will  guarantee that “A cannot X” and think that this third proposition is logically
correct, otherwise we made the “denying the antecedent” mistake. However, when conditional analysts
posit C as a sufficient condition to X, we can think of cases where the “A cannot X” does come from
“Not -C”, so the third proposition is not entirely mistaken or implausible. 
More importantly, as Berofsky points out, “Lehrer’s logical point hinges only on the compatibility of
these  three  propositions,  not  the  plausibility  of  any  of  them.”  (Berofsky,  2002:  191)These  three
propositions are consistent with each other (even though the third proposition can be interpreted as
being implausible in certain occasions), but if we think of the first proposition as “A can X”, then we
have a contradiction between the first and the third propositions. 
Another thing to note is that this argument assumes that if the agent does X, then A can X. Otherwise,
the second premise would by no means imply the third one. 
Now I would reply to this substitution problem. I think there’s an ambiguity in the usage of “can” in
this argument. What the first proposition substitutes is “A can X” in a CHDO sense, that is, A has the
ability to do otherwise, which, as we would think, lasts for some time. “Can” in this sense is similar to
some kind of skill one possesses, for example, if I can build a ship, my ability to build a ship tends to
last for some time. On the other hand, on one particular occasion, I am not able to build a ship due to
the lack of material I need, and I cannot build a ship on this particular occasion, but this does not mean
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that my ability to build a ship is lost; the third proposition talks about “can” in this sense – a case to
case usage of “can”. Therefore, once we have differentiated the different usage of “can” in what the
first  proposition substitutes and the third proposition itself,  this substitution problem does not hold
against conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise anymore. 
– Freedom-Undermining Situations
One further problem for conditional analysis in general is that there are cases where the agent just
cannot do certain things because of certain external factors, like psychological compulsion. 
As Christian List points out that, 
most of us will agree that if an agent is never psychologically capable of trying to take any action other than a single
predestined one, perhaps due to some deep psychological obsession, then he or she cannot be said to have the ability
to do otherwise. (List, 2011: 6)
The passage quoted here talks about a situation where the agent could not have done otherwise no
matter what because of his psychology compulsion, and List believes that the readers will agree with
his claim here. 
According to List, to be counted as a successful analysis of CHDO, conditional analysis of freedom
should be  able  to  keep the  agent’s  ability to  do otherwise even under  these freedom-undermining
situations, but because we would agree that the agent could not have done otherwise in these cases and
it would be very counter-intuitive if we think that the agent could, conditional analysis of CHDO fails
in this sense. List believes believes the conditional analysts need to deal with these cases, otherwise the
compatibility between CHDO and determinism just came too easy for the conditional analysts.
I argue these cases are not real problem for the conditional analysis of CHDO.
If we look at the case of the agent who has psychological compulsion, it is quite clear that the way the
agent is deprived of CHDO by his psychological compulsion and the way the agent is deprived of
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CHDO by determinism are different, and I think the discussion of the case of psychological compulsion
(more generally speaking, freedom-undermining situations) and the discussion of determinism should
be put on different planes. 
In the psychological compulsion case, whether we endorse determinism or not, the agent is bound to
lose his alternative possibility due to his compulsion. On the other hand, we would agree that there are
many other  situations we think that the agent  could have done otherwise,  call  these non-freedom-
undermining situations. Now if we endorse determinism, the incompatiblists would argue that the agent
could not have done otherwise in any kind of situations, be it freedom-undermining situations or non-
freedom-undermining situations; then the debate between compatiblists and incompatiblists would be
about whether human agents have the ability to do otherwise or not in this very broad sense – given the
way nature operates, can human agents do otherwise? The discussion on this plane is very fundamental,
and it is about whether human agents have free will or not if we have a deterministic natural law, while
the  discussion  on  the  plane  of  freedom-  undermining  situations  is  about  our  common  sense
understanding of freedom. 
Conditional analysis of freedom is on the plane about determinism, which is different from the plane
this criticism happens, so the “freedom-undermining situations” criticism does not really pose a threat
to conditional analysis. 
Now I would like to say a little bit more about what I mean by freedom-undermining situations. The
idea of freedom- undermining factors plays a role in the discussion of when it is fair to hold someone
responsible.
When  incompatiblistis  claim that  determinism deprive  the  agents  of  free  will,  some of  them also
suggest that nobody would ever have to take responsibility for what they have done, because if one
does not have free will, one cannot really choose to do what he has done and if what one has done does
not really come from this person, then he cannot be said to be responsible for this action he has done;
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since incompatibilism incapacitate the agents from really doing anything by themselves, there are no
things that they should be held responsible for.
The reaction to this claim is certainly that it is highly counter-intuitive and implausible: we do not think
that  people  do  not  take  responsibility  for  what  they  do.  So  now  if  we  switch  our  position  to
compatibilism  which  claims  that  determinism  and  free  will  can  co-exist  and  the  agents  do  take
responsibilities  for  their  actions,  we still  feel  that  there  are  situations  where  the  agents  should  be
exempted from taking responsibilities. These situations are the freedom-undermining situations. 
To illustrate,  Haji  has  given us  a  couple  of  situations,  like  “coercion,  physical  constraint,  duress,
mistake, accident and inadvertence”. (Haji, 2002) This list is certainly not exhaustive and I believe that
we can detect whether the agent is in a freedom-undermining situation or not by using our common
sense. Freedom-undermining factors reflect our common sense of freedom, and this type of practical
thinking can coexist with determinism just fine.
As Haji points out that “determinism does not entail that people never have the power to recognize and
act  on moral  reasons that  underpin(support)  obligations.”  (Haji,  2002:  208)  Determinism does  not
undermine the agents’ ability to recognize and act on moral reasons, according to Haji, if the agent
loses  his  ability  to  recognize  and  act  on  moral  reasons,  then  we  know  that  he  is  in  a  freedom-
undermining situation where we think it is appropriate to exempt the agent from moral punishment and
freedom-undermining  situation  is  a  good  indicator  where  we  can  exempt  the  agents  from moral
responsibilities. 
I contend that it is wrong for List to use the case of psychological compulsion as a counter-argument
against conditional analysis of CHDO, which is an analysis that aims to save CHDO from determinism,
not from freedom-undermining situations. 
2). Cases Where the Desired Action is not Brought About by the Agent’s Desire
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After addressing two problems against general version of conditional analysis, now I’m going to talk
about more specific problems the conditional analysis with an antecedent of desire faces.
The conditional analysis “the agent would have done otherwise if he had desired to” presupposes a
causal link from the agents’ desires to the agents’ actions. So if we want to give a precise description of
conditional analysis of CHDO, we need to say more about this link .
Daivdson points out one difficulty formulating conditional analysis of CHDO is that “the attempt may
bring about the desired effect in an unexpected or undesired way.”  and what is important is that “the
action must follow the right sort of route.” (Davidson, 1973)
To illustrate, Davidson shows us an example: “A man may try to kill someone by shooting at him.
Suppose the killer misses his victim by a mile, but the shot stampedes a herd of wild pigs that trample
the intended victim to death.” (Davidson, 1973: 78) 
By  our  common  understanding,  if  we  want  to  say  that  the  alternative  action  was  led  to  by  the
antecedent “desire”, then we would think that the agent’s shot caused the victim’s death; this example
of wayward causal chain makes the link from the desire to the action seem ambiguous –  can we still
say that this agent’s desire of killing causes the act of killing if victim’s death is not directly caused by
the agent’s shot? 
On one hand, we could say “yes” because it is the agent’s desire that causes him to shot, and it is the
shot that stampedes a herd of wild pigs that trample the victim to death; the agent’s desire did finally
lead to the death of the victim. But on the other hand, we could say “no” because the agent intended to
kill the victim by shooting him to death but failed to do so in the example we talk about and it seems
that  he  did  not  carry  out  his  plan  as  he  intended.  This  kind  of  “twisted”  causal  chain  makes  it
ambiguous for us to say whether the consequent “action” is really led to by the antecedent “desire” or
not. 
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There are other cases where it is more obvious that the actions we would have done are not led to by
our desires; for example, sometimes A would have done otherwise X not because A had desired to do
X, but rather A thought he should do X out of his principles, or consider cases where A cannot decide
whether he does this or that, so he flips a coin and let the result of the flipping lead him to do his
actions18. 
Now if the conditional analysts want to say that “I could have done otherwise” means “I would have
done otherwise if I had desired to”,  then they should make our account of conditional analysis cover
the cases where our action is not led to by our desire; as these cases have shown us, when we say “I
could have done otherwise”, we do not always mean “I would have done otherwise if I had desired to”,
we could also mean that, for instance, “I would have done otherwise if I thought I should do”.
However, it  seems that these cases where the action is not caused by the corresponding desire are
outside the scope of conditional analysis since conditional analysis assumes the action X is caused by
the agent’s desire to do the action X. 
This becomes a tension for conditional analysis, and it seems difficult for conditional analysis with an
antecedent of desire to include these cases where the desired action is not brought about by the agent’s
desire.
The reply to this worry is that the antecedent part of the conditional proposition is not a necessary
condition to the alternative action in question,  but rather a sufficient condition. Accordingly,  if  the
antecedent condition of desire is fulfilled, then the alternative action would be brought about; on the
other hand, if the alternative action in question had been brought about already, it does not mean that it
18  To be more clear, sometimes we have difficulties making a decision whether we do A or B, so we flip a coin – if heads, 
I do A and if tails I do B. Some may say that this case is not so different from the case where the alternative action was 
led to by an antecedent of “desire” if we think it was actually my desire to follow the result of the coin- flipping that 
leads me to do either A or B. I would argue that in the case of coin flipping, it was not my desire to do A or B; rather, in 
a normal case where the action was led to by the antecedent “desire”, it was really my desire to do a certain action X 
that leads me to do X. So the conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire does not cover the case of coin
flipping. 
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is caused by our desires. By looking at the antecedent desire as a sufficient condition to the alternative
action, we have resolved this worry.
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6. Reply to “Desire is Not Enough” Problem
After the discussion above, we have addressed some of the problems facing conditional analysis in
general  and I  have  also excluded the problem for  this  special  version of  conditional  analysis  I’m
defending that there are some cases where the alternative action was not led to  by the antecedent
“desire”.  I  stress  the  point  that  the  antecedent  of  “desire”  which  conditional  analysts  posited  is  a
sufficient condition, not a necessary condition to the alternative action. 
Now I’m reinterating the point that conditional analysis is to posit an antecedent condition that the
agent needed to fulfill first so that he could bring about an alternative action, by doing so, they have
made CHDO compatible with determinism. This assumes a link from the antecedent to the action, and I
would like to say more about this link in this chapter.
My thesis is to defend the conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire. I said I would
defend it by considering the problems it faces. I still  haven’t replied to the “desire is not enough”
problem talked about in Chapter 4 yet. I believe by discussing what this link from antecedent “desire”
to the alternative action is about, I will be able to reply to the “desire is not enough” criticism. 
1). Recap: Two Aims of Conditional Analysis
Earlier, I have mentioned that conditional analysis with an antecedent of desire suffers the problem of
not being genuine, to be precise, “A would have done otherwise if he had desired to” assumes that the
alternative action the agent did was led to by his desire, but one’s desire does not automatically or
necessarily lead to one’s action, and there seem to be other conditions need to be met, besides the
antecedent condition “desire”, for the action to be carried out. It seems that the conditional analysts
have  ignored  some  other  conditions  necessary for  the  consequent  “action”,  and  this  is  also  what
Davidson  and  Berofsky are  calling  for:  to  specify the  necessary and  sufficient  conditions  for  the
alternative action. 
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While this may be the case, let’s not forget where conditional analysis of CHDO come from in the first
place. 
Recall,  incompatiblis  believe  that  determinism undermines  the  power  to  do  otherwise  because  if
determinism is true, at time t, I could not do anything else other than the thing I did at time t. My
biography led to my action at time t, and I could not have done otherwise. Compatibilists believe that
when we say that we could have done otherwise, we do not just mean “we could have done otherwise,
period”, and we have some “antecedent condition” in our minds; a very common antecedent condition
compatibilists give us is “if I had desired to”. 
For example, according to incompatibilists, under determinism, at time t, I was drinking water, then
drinking water is the only thing I could do at time t. But we would think that’s really implausible,
because in real life I’m very confident that I could have made other alternatives happen. 
Now, compatiblisits come into picture saying that CHDO actually means that “the agent would have
done otherwise if he had desired to”. In this case of “me drinking water”, while the fact is that I drank
water at time t, I would have drank coffee if had desire to drink coffee; if I did not have the desire of
drinking coffee, drinking coffee is just not something I would do at time t. I agree with compatibilist’s
observation here. If I do not have the desire to do something else, why should I care about the option
available to me.
Why should I care about whether I have the ability to bring make certain thing happen if I’m not
interested in making it happen? I do think conditional analysis has captured the normative sense of
CHDO – we are not interested in the ability to do otherwise X if X is something we do not want to do.  
At the same time, compatibilisits believe that conditional analysis  of CHDO is a strategy to make
CHDO compatible with determinism. As mentioned before, one of the necessary conditions for the
conclusion that “I could only drink water at a given time t” is the desire that I had at an earlier time t0
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has led me to carry out the action of drinking water at time t. For me to drink coffee would require a
different desire at an earlier time t0, namely, my desire to drink coffee. If we have replaced the 
original desire (which leads to X at current time t), as the conditional analysts have suggested, with a
different desire at a previous time t0, then we have rejected one of the necessary conditions for the
unalterability of the current state of affair, then the conclusion that I can only drink water at time t does
not hold anymore – I could have done otherwise.  This interpretation of CHDO is compatible with
determinism, because a different desire at a previous time t0 which would lead to an alternative action
exists in some other tape which also runs according to determinism, but just does not exist. 
So when conditional analysts have designated the conditional analysis of freedom, I believe they have
two prime purposes: 1). they are leading us to see what we normally mean when we say I could have
done otherwise 2). they want to make CHDO and determinism compatible with each other. 
Now  both  of  the  aims  do  not  require  the  conditional  analysts  to  do  more  than  just  positing  an
antecedent, so it is natural for them to omit the other conditions which are necessary for the alternative
actions. 
2). A Closer Look at the Conditional Interpretation of CHDO
If one of the conditional analysis’ main aim is to make us see how we use CHDO in daily life, then let’s
take a closer look at how we normally use CHDO. 
When people utter the sentence “I could have done otherwise”, or as conditional analysts insist, “I
would have done otherwise if I had desired to”, I believe that they have already assumed the agent’s
ability and the external conditions needed to bring about the alternative action. If people genuinely and
realistically utter the sentence “I could have done otherwise”, I think they are certainly not unaware of
the other conditions which are necessary for an action besides desire. For example, if I genuinely mean
that I could have drunk coffee (when I actually drink the water at time t), I have already assumed my
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ability to get and drink coffee and there’s coffee available. I’m also being realistic here when I say I
could have drunk coffee, because I know I can drink coffee under normal conditions; I would not say
that I would have flown if I had desired to or I would have eaten a ton of yogurt if I had desired to. 
Another point I would like to make is that not only people have assumed their own abilities and normal
conditions when they say “I would have done otherwise if I had desired to”, they also know that CHDO
is not that kind of ability which will  certainly bring about its result, but kind of, what I would call,
probable ability19. For example, when I say I could have drunk the coffee other than water at time t,
what I precisely mean is that, it is very likely that if I want to drink coffee, I can make it happen. I have
assumed my ability (to drink the coffee, to make coffee, to buy coffee and so on) and the probability (of
coffee being available, hot water being available and so on). But it is a very likely scenario that there’s
no more coffee at my home and it is very late already and the shops which sell coffee are closed. So
there’s chance that I cannot bring about the alternative consequent of me drinking coffee but I know I
can do so in most cases. 
3). My Proposal of Formulating Conditional Analysis 
I propose that conditional analysis of CHDO with antecedent of desire should make it explicit that
CHDO is a probable ability, not as an ability that will  certainly bring about its result, which means
19This is not to be confused with the idea of Probablity Causality.  According to David Lewis's theory of Probability 
Causality, “the event E is said to causally depend upon the distinct event C just in case both occur and the probability 
that E would occur, at the time of C′s occurrence, was much higher than it would have been at the corresponding time 
if C had not occurred.”
Now this seems to say that even if E had not occurred, C would have happened. This is not what I want to 
say. I want to focus on the case where E’s occurrence depends on C, which means that if we do not have C, we would 
not have E. This is the purpose of conditional analysis in the first place: we add an C to the proposition describes the 
agent’s ability to make E happen in order to make this ability compatible with free will. 
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even if  the  agent  has  the  relevant  ability and opportunity (external  conditions)  to  bring  about  the
alternative action, he may not always be able to do so. 
- Type Ability 
Now let me say a little bit more about this ability(different from the ability to do otherwise) the agent
has and the external conditions we are dealing here. 
Berofsky in his paper has talked about the difference between a token ability and a type ability: type
ability is like some kind of talent or skill that the agent possesses, but he may not be able to use this
kind of ability in every situation, exactly because sometimes the environment does not provide enough
external conditions for the agent to use his talent/skill/type ability; token ability, on the other hand,
refers to the agent’s ability to bring about a certain action in a certain situation. (Berofsky, 196) The
ability to do otherwise should be seen as a token ability; the ability the compatibilists have assumed
when they formulated conditional analysis is the type ability Berofsky is talking about, and this type
ability to do X is certainly one condition the agent absolutely needs if we want to say that he has the
ability to do otherwise X. 
Now I would like to borrow this term “type ability” from Berofsky, but to expand the notion of it. 
First of all, the idea of type ability is close to the idea of talent or skill one possesses. If we think type
ability as one’s talent or skill, one thing to say here is that it is not easy to draw a line where the agent
has the talent or not. For example, it may not always be clear whether the agent has the talent to cook
or not – at some certain time, at some places, some one may be considered a competent cook and in
some other places, and at  some other times,  the same person with a same level of competency in
cooking could be considered as incompetent. This really depends on the situation. 
On the other hand, the idea of “type ability” should not be limited to talent/skill. Let’s consider an
example and see what other things the type abilitiy can refer to: Tom wanted to master the skill of
political science, so he decided to spend his weekend in a library studying about the subject.  This
decision to study comes from his own free will; he could have stayed at home watching TV, he could
have gone to a museum, and he could have also relaxed himself in woods. 
Now let’s take one of these alternative possibilities ans discuss about it; let’s pick “Tom could have
stayed at home watching TV”. I choose this possibility because staying at home watching TV barely
feels like a talent or ability understood in a normal sense. But he does need something to be home to
watch TV. It is hard to pinpoint and describe exactly what he needs to stay at home and watch TV; let’s
just say he needs the type ability to do so. So “type ability” can also refer to something like “watch
TV” or “stay at home”. 
The point of this discussion is that “type ability” should not just be understood strictly as talent, skill,
and ability; it could also be understood something that the agent possesses which he needs in order to
do very simple things. 
Now this “type ability” is really about what the agent can do as understood in a very common sense, for
example, as we have discussed above, the agent can cook, or in more loose sense, the agent can stay
home and watch TV. We are dealing with the things which the agent can do. So what is the scope here? 
Clearly, there are many thing the agent cannot do. Some simple examples would be that agents cannot
fly or that not everyone can become a millionaire, and of course we would not even think to give a
conditional analysis to the proposition like “the agent can fly” or “the agent can become a millionaire”.
We should not be too generous to “include all the things we could bring about through our intentional
action, whether by plan or by accident, through blind luck or masterful” (Davidson, 1973) as Davidson
puts it, and we need to have some kind of scope of the cases we are dealing with which regard what the
agent could have done. Talking about this scope and what a person can do, Davidson suggests that “for
practical purposes we are often interested in more limited concepts of what we can do – what we do do
if we want or intend or try to do it, for example, or what we can do reliably.” (Davidson, 1973: 71)
38
“Reliably” here means the agent has the ability to do X in a very common sense. For example, a good
singer can give a great performance or I can turn on my laptop and write papers. 
Even though what Davidson said here is still a little bit vague, I believe that this is the best we can get.
I argue that it is very difficult to give a precise criteria for what the agent can do or what the type ability
can refer to, but at the same time, we do have a very good indicator to judge whether someone can or
cannot do something, and that is our common sense.  
Another thing to add is that type ability should have some temporal stability, which means it should last
for a while for the agent. One may say that the type ability that the agent has does not last forever. For
example, a singer who has an outstanding technique when she was young may not sing very well when
she got older. I say that the type ability, although it would disappear, it tends to stay for a period of time
for the agent. 
- Luck 
Besides  the type ability the agent  possesses,  to  bring about  the action,  the agent  also needs  some
external conditions to support his talent. Even though the agent has the talent to cook good food for his
guests, he may not succeed every single time; maybe he does not feel well the time he fails, or maybe
the oven he needs is not working or maybe some essential ingredients he need are missing. However,
this does not mean that the agent would not have cooked good food if he had desired to, because under
normal conditions, he was able to do so. The normal conditions are what the agent needs besides his
type ability, and we could also call this “luck” – he needs luck to use his talent properly. There will
always be exceptional cases where some of the normal conditions are deprived and the agent cannot
use his type ability to bring about the alternative action so as I have proposed earlier that we should
think CHDO as a probable ability. 
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This observation that the ability to do otherwise means that the agent would very likely to carry out the
alternative action can be found in other philosophers’ work.
For example, Moore has said that, “It is, therefore, quite certain (1) that we often should have acted
differently, if we had chosen to; (2) that similarly we often should have chosen differently, if we had
chosen so to choose; and (3) that it was almost always possible that we should have chosen differently,
in the sense that no man could know for certain that we should not so choose.”  (Moore, 1912: 2) We
can notice that Moore has used words like “often” and “almost always”, I take him to stress the same
point as I do – CHDO is not an ability that will bring about the result in every single case. 
Let’s also take a look at this passage from Leher. “For the purpose of this paper, I shall assume that if a
hypothesis is very highly probable with respect to some kind of empirical evidence, then it is possible
to know that hypothesis empirically. Thus, I shall attempt to prove that the hypothesis that a person
could have done otherwise is very highly probable with respect to some kind of empirical evidence.”
(Lehrer, 1966) Lehrer20 has made an epistemic claim about CHDO, even though my claim about CHDO
is a metaphysical one, there’s some similarities about the “probablity” nature of CHDO. Lehrer has
used “highly probable” to describe the ability to do otherwise.
In addition, Ginet has said that the prefix “it was in S’s power at t to make it the case that…” expresses
a certain type of possibility for the whole proposition. (Ginet, 1980: 173) I take him as saying that one’s
ability to bring about something is only a possibility, which means that if we say that the agent has the
20Lehrer’s paper has also dealt with another aspect of my intepretation of CHDO, that is, we need assume the ability 
and opportunity when we say that the agent would have done otherwise if he had desired to; Lehrer has mentioned the
conditions of temporal propinquity, circumstantial variety, agent similarity, and simple frequency.
This point resonates with Angelika Kratzer’s analysis of “can”, as mentioned in List’s paper “Free Will, 
Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise”, who believes that when we use the word “can” there's always 
an additional of the form "in view of X". She believes that there have to be some other conditions which need to be 
specified out when we say someone can do something. (Kratzer, 1977)
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power to do X, we mean that it is only possible for him to do X, not that he will just do X if he wants
to. 
To conclude, I suggest that conditional analysts explicitly list “type ability” and “luck” as two other
conditions besides the antecedent “desire” for the alternative action. Needless to say, they also need to
explain what “type ability” and “luck” refer to, more importantly, they need to point out that the ability
to do otherwise is a probability ability and describe the mechanism how the antecedent “desire” leads
to the alternative action. I believe once conditional analysts have made this effort, they can successfully
reply to the criticism that “desire is not enough”.   
41
7. One More Criticism: Conditional Analysis Has Lowered the Standard
Some say that conditional analysis of CHDO is a watered-down version of CHDO itself. They insist
that CHDO to be analyzed when all the conditions leading to the state of affairs at time t to be held
constantly. The conditional analysts believe that what we mean by CHDO actually requires the history
leading to what happened at time t to be changed, but some of the incompatibilists would insist that
this should not be the case. I will consider two arguments in this chapter, which shift the burdens of
proof to the incompatibilsits’s camp, that is to say, the incompatibilists have to defend themselves when
they finish reading my thesis and find themselves more convincing arguments to explain why we need
to insist that CHDO actually means CHDO without any antecedent condition.
1). Incompatibilists’ Insistence 
After the discussion before, I have defended the conditional analysis from various problems it faces and
I have also argued that conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire is an efficient way to
defend the compatibility between CHDO and determinism. In this chapter, I will defend conditional
analysis with an antecedent of desire from one more problem it faces by considering some arguments
which introduce us to some new terminology of describing the compatibilist’s position, and I believe
these arguments have shifted the burden of proof to the incompatibilist’s camp. 
Some say that conditional analysis of CHDO is watered-down version of the modal interpretation of
CHDO21.  For example, in his paper, List has stated that “it is widely held that the compatibility of
determinism and the  ability to  do otherwise comes  too cheap under  a  conditional  or  dispositional
interpretation.” (List, 2011: 6) This criticism against conditional analysis implies that when we used the
conditional analysis interpretation of CHDO, we are lowering our standard of CHDO. 
21 This expression comes from Christian List. According to List, modal interpretation of CHDO means “I could not have 
done otherwise, period”. In other words, it means CHDO in the context where the agent’s history leading to his action at
time t stays unchanged.
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Some believe that alternative possibility should be talked about in an absolute kind of way, which
means we do not add an antecedent part to the CHDO proposition. 
For example, Susan Hurley says that “the conditional analysis is incorrect. The ability to do otherwise
entails  the  outright  possibility  of  acting  otherwise,  holding  all  else  constant.  A counterfactually
conditioned disposition  to  act  otherwise  is  not  the  same thing  as  an outright  possibility of  acting
otherwise.”  (Hurley,  1999: 206) Similarly, Ginet insists that “possibility” means that “nothing that
exists up to that moment in time stands in the way of my doing next any one of the alternatives”.
(Ginet, 2002: 387)  
Conditional  analysts  believe  that  we need to  reassess  CHDO so that  we can  see  that  CHDO and
determinism are compatible with each other. According to conditional analysts,  CHDO means “the
agent  would have done otherwise if  he had desired to”.  This  reassessment  requires  the conditions
leading to the action at a past given time t be modified – a different desire took place at an earlier time
t0  would replace the original desire which rationalize the agent’s action at time t.  Some disagree with
this reassessment of “could have done otherwise”, for example,  John L. Austin argues, when talking
about a specific example of CHDO “I could have holed differently”,  that “it is not that I should have
holed it if conditions had been different: that might of course be so, but I am talking about conditions as
they precisely were.” (Austin, 1961: 308)
2). Possible Worlds and Alternative Possibility 
The conditional analysis, in the first place, is to lead the readers to see what people normally would
think about and talk about CHDO, according to conditional analysis of CHDO, CHDO means “I would
have done otherwise if I had desired to.” But this interpretation would require a different desire at an
earlier time t0 and alteration of some other conditions of the agent’s history from time to to time t. The
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incompatibilists who reject conditional analysis would insist that we talk about CHDO as the agent’s
biography remains the same.
To reply to this challenge, Taylor and Dennett have introduced a possible world argument which I find
interesting and worth considering. This argument goes something like this: when we start to build our
theory, the theory needs an ontology to support it, and we need to make clear what we put into this
ontology. Taylor and Dennett points out that if we admit into the ontology just the world that is exactly
like ours,  then we will  come to believe that  determinism is  depriving our ability to do otherwise.
Because if we only have in our ontology the world that is exactly like ours, then we only have “one
tape” to look at. To be more precise, “this tape” Taylor and Dennett refers to is the scenario leads to a
certain event at time t. If we only have one world that is exactly like the one we are living in, then we
will just replay the tape over and over again when we assess the whole situation. We will find that
there’s nothing that we can alter. According to the Taylor and Dennett, if we open up our minds a little
bit,  if  we  admit  into  our  ontology  more  possible  worlds,  we  will  realize  that  determinism  can
comfortably coexist with alternative possibility. To be a little bit more formal, the other possible worlds
we take into should be different from our actual world in some details at time t0, which is a time before
time t. We know that any little difference at time t0 in a new possible world similar to ours could in
theory lead to a very different result at time t. Therefore, we could have different results at t at different
possible worlds – we have saved CHDO (Dennett, Taylor 2002).
Now I would like to briefly introduce the concept of possible worlds to make the argument above more
clearly. First of all, possible worlds is a very common way dealing with modality. But then, what is a
possible world? David Lewis believes that a possible world is a “maximally connected space-time
region” and anything that is spationtemporally connected to us is a part of our world. Lewis also says
that “each (possible) world lies in its own space-time, and the worlds are concrete and exist in the same
sense as our world.” (Lewis, 1968) Lewis also points out that our world does not have any special
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existence other than being one of the possible worlds and  “.. nothing that occurs in one world has any
causal impact on anything that occurs in any other  world ..” (Lewis,1968),  which means that  two
possible worlds have no relation whatsoever with each other at all. 
Another question would be that how we should choose possible worlds into our ontology. Taylor and
Dennett believe that we should not make the range of possible worlds we choose too narrow; they did
not give a precise criteria for how should we choose possible worlds. Since we are investigating the
proposition  that  “A would  have  done  otherwise  if  he  had  desired  to”,  somewhere  in  Taylor  and
Dennett’s paper, they suggest that we could include three other possible worlds, besides the actual one
we  are  living  in,  the  other  three  possible  worlds  would  have  to  represent  the  same  conditional
proposition that we are dealing with but with the negation of the consequent part, one with the negation
of the antecedent and one with both negations of the consequent and antecedent. 
What we include in our ontology and how we choose possible worlds is very much related to how we
think about alternative situations in real life because this possible worlds arguments from Taylor and
Dennett in the first place is to help us to have clearer understanding of modality. As pointed out by
Vihvelin, “when we evaluate counterfactuals in real life, we do so by considering imaginary situations
which are very like the situation we are actually in, and we do not suppose that there are any gratuitous
departures  from actuality.”  (Vihvelin,  2011)  This  corresponds with the idea that  the other  possible
worlds we include in our ontology should characteristically be very similar to our real world; one could
say that the things in a possible world is the recombination of the things which we have in our own
world. 
Now let’s look at an example of how this strategy works. Charlotte at time t, was about to make a
decision to either become a musician in the Berliner Philharmoniker Orchestra or to become a medicine
student. She chooses to become a musician.  However, she could very well have become a medicine
student--  she  was  qualified  and  she  was  also  very  interested  in  becoming  a  medicine  student.
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Incompatibilists  believe that  Charlotte  could not  have become a medicine student if  we endorse a
deterministic picture of universe. Clearly, that’s not true. In real life, it is very intuitive for us to think
that Charlotte could very well become a medicine student, because Charlotte had both the qualification
and the will to become a medicine student. 
So how shall we keep this intuition of ours in a world functioning with a deterministic natural law? 
Taylor and Dennett suggest that we could admit into our ontology more than one possible world. In this
case of Charlotte, we do not just look at the world that is exactly like ours where Charlotte chose to
become a musician, but we add into our ontology a possible world which is almost exactly like ours.
This possible world at time t0 differs from our world in a few details. 
Let’s  be  a  little  bit  experimental  with  these  altered  details.  Charlotte  was  pondering  about  which
decision she was going to make, either to become a musician or to become a medicine student, then she
read some story of Dr Bach's flower remedies and got really inspired. She felt medicine was actually
more exciting and interesting, then she made the decision to become a medicine student at time t. In
this newly admitted possible world, because Charlotte had gone through some different experiences
from the ones she had gone through in the world that is exactly like ours, she made the decision to
become a medicine student.  Notice that,  this  new possible  world we include in  our ontology also
operates according to deterministic natural rule – we did not change our position about determinism;
we just broaden the scope of our ontology and include some new possible worlds which differ from our
real world in some details during the period of time from time t0 to t. Consequently, CHDO is not being
undermined by determinism. 
The incompatibilists say that there’s only action22 that the agent could do at time t under determinism,
and there’s no genuine alternative possibility in this picture. The possible world approach is going to
take us to see why these incompatiblists take this position and what they have implicitly endorsed when
22 Once again, what the agent did at time t may not necessarily be just one action, it could also be a set of actions. This is 
just a convenient way of describing the argument.
46
they say that we have only our actual world to look at, and we find out what they endorse is the narrow
approach of possible worlds – we only include in our ontology of the world that we are living now. So
now the burden of proof has shifted to the incompatiblist’s camp, because now they have to explain to
us why do we have to insist that CHDO means that the agent could have done otherwise given all
conditions leading to the action at time t be held constant and why we cannot open up our minds a little
bit and include several other possible worlds other than the current world we are living in. 
3). David Lewis’ Divergence Miracle
In David Lewis’ “Are We Free to Break Laws”, Lewis also offers us an argument that shifts the burden
of proof to the incompatibilist’s camp. 
Lewis first claims that there are two types of understanding of breaking the law. A strong thesis and a
weak thesis. A strong thesis of law is that I am able to break a law and a weak thesis of law is that I am
able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken.
Lewis argues that for the agent to do otherwise under determinism, a law would have to be broken and
compatiblists should accept a weaker thesis of breaking the law. Lewis argues playfully, “.. I insist that
I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I
deny that I am therefore able to break a law ..” (Lewis, 1981: 125)
Lewis explains that it is not that I am able to break a law because I have done some alternative action,
but rather that if have done the alternative action, then my action would be a law-breaking event and
law would have been broken before I have done the alternative action. Lewis further states that,  “had I
raised  my hand,  a  law would  have  been  broken  beforehand.  The  course  of  events  would  have
diverged from the actual course of events a little while before I raised my hand, and at the point of
divergence there would have been a law-breaking event – a divergence miracle, as I have called it.”
(Lewis, 1981: 125)
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This is the interesting part of Lewis’ argument, he believes that for an alternative action to take place, a
divergence  miracle  would  have  to  happen  before  the  occurrence  of  the  alternative  action.  This
divergence miracle would alter the course of history leading to the action that takes place at time t,
which will produce a different action. Obviously, one’s history cannot really be altered, so the law of
nature has to be broken in order for the change in the course of one’s history to happen. One important
distinction for Lewis is that it is not that I am able to break a law (this is the Strong thesis), but me
being able to do otherwise is a law-breaking event and the law had to be broken (a divergence miracle
had to happen) before I have done otherwise. 
Similar to Taylor and Dennett’s argument, we have to make some changes to the conditions which lead
to the current action at time t. In Taylor and Dennett’s argument, theses changes are made possible
when we expand the scope of our ontology and includes some other possible worlds which are similar
to ours, and in Lewis’ argument, these changes can take place if we accept a weak thesis of breaking
the law which means a divergence miracle would have to happen before the occurrence of the action,
be it alternative or actual, at time t. 
Similarly, Lewis’s argument has shifted the burden of proof to the incompatibilists’ camp. Now the
incompatibilists have to explain why compatibilists have to accept a strong thesis of breaking the law. 
As Vihvelin puts it, “The compatibilist is committed only to saying that if determinism is true, we have
abilities  which  we  would  exercise  only  if  the  past  (and/or  the  laws)  had  been  different  in  the
appropriate ways.  And while this may sound odd, it is no more incredible than the claim that the
successful exercise of our abilities depends, not only on us, but also on the co-operation of factors
outside our control.” (Vihvelin, 2011) What Vihvelin also wants to point out, especially when she says
that “the successful exercise of one’s ability depends on external environment”, is that a different action
was led to by a different desire, and a different desire would require us to look at another possible
world or to allow a divergence miracle to happen. I think Vihvelin is exploring the point, as mentioned
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in the previous chapter,  that desire is not something that the agent does, but rather it comes to the agent
itself. 
To conclude, the criticism we set out to reply is that conditional analysis of CHDO is a watered-down
version of modal interpretation of CHDO. I believe that we should not take this criticism seriously
especially after the discussion in this section. While it is true that we have made CHDO compatible
with determinism with the conditional analysis of CHDO, it doesn’t mean that we have “lowered” the
standard, because it is not clear that CHDO without the conditional part should be the benchmark or it
is the best interpretation of CHDO. 
Some incompatibilist would still insist that we hold on to the modal interpretation of CHDO, and they
would insist the conditional analysis of CHDO is a watered-down version of CHDO. So now we have a
deadlock – a disputation about which version of CHDO we should take.  
The two arguments I have considered in this chapter, one from Taylor and Dennett and another one
from Lewis have used new terminology to describe the deadlock; they have also shown us what the two
positions  respectively  imply.  The  incomapibilists  cannot  just  say  that  the  modal  interpretation  of
CHDO is  the best  interpretation of CHDO; especially now they have to  use the new terminology
offered by these two arguments to defend themselves. These two argument have helped us shifted the
burden  of  proof  to  the  incompatibilists’s  side.  I  do  not  mean  that  the  incompatibilists  cannot
successfully formulate very convincing counter-argument; if we think it is a tie between compatibilists
and  incompatiblists  when  the  deadlock  was  described,  then  at  the  end  of  my thesis,  because  the
incompatiblists have to make the effort defending themselves now, the compatiblists’ side has more
strength. 
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Conclusion
As I mentioned in the introduction, conditional analysis of CHDO wasn’t considered to be successful
by many. I find conditional analysis of CHDO to be quite convincing and interesting. I think it has
captured what we normally mean when we say “I could have done otherwise”, and I also believe what
we normally mean is also compatible with determinism. 
In my thesis, I have defended a special version of conditional analysis of freedom – the conditional
analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire. 
I tried to achieve this goal, first, by arguing why the antecedent of “desire” has more advantages than
the antecedent of an action sort; I said that because the antecedent of “desire” does not suffer the
infinite regress problem and it will not be read as part of the action in question.  
Subsequently, I’ve considered four problems the conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of
desire  faces:  “substitution  problem”,  “freedom-undermining  situations”  problem,  “cases  where  the
alternative action was not led to by the antecedent desire” problem and “desire is not enough” criticism.
First, I argued that because there’s an ambiguity of “can” in the “substitution problem”, this problem
does  not  hold  itself.  Then I  pointed  out  that  the  way freedom-undermining  situations  deprive  the
agents’ ability to do otherwise and the way determinism deprives the agent’s ability to do otherwise are
different,  so  the  freedom-undermining  situations  problem  does  not  take  away  the  legitimacy  of
conditional analysis. 
Some criticize that conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire did not include the cases
where the alternative action was not led to by the antecedent desire; the critics believe it should because
sometimes when we say “I could have done otherwise”, we do not mean “I would have done otherwise
if I had desired to” – our alternative action would come from some other causes. I argued that the
antecedent  “desire”  conditional  analysts  posited  was  only  a  sufficient  condition,  not  a  necessary
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condition, and if we have this in mind, then we understand that the conditional analysis does allow that
the consequence is not necessarily led to by the antecedent. 
Regarding  the  last  problem listed  here,  the  “desire  is  not  enough”  problem,  I  contended  that  the
conditional analysts are aware of the fact that the antecedent desire would not automatically lead to the
alternative action; their aim is to show us what we normally mean by CHDO and to make CHDO
compatible with determinism. These two aims can be achieved by just positing the antecedent without
saying anything else. By looking it this way, we understand that the “desire is not enough” problem is
more of a misunderstanding. However, considering problem like this, I proposed that compatiblists
should formulate a more clear and more detailed account of conditional analysis of CHDO with an
antecedent of desire. 
After  replying  to  all  these  problems,  in  Chapter  7,  I  considered  one  more  criticism,  namely,  the
conditional analysis of CHDO has lowered the standard for the compatibility between determinism and
CHDO; the incompatibilists argue that we should insist that “I could have done otherwise” means just
“I could have done otherwise”.
This criticism can be seen as a disagreement between the compatibilists and incompatiblists  about
which interpretation of CHDO we should take. I considered interesting two arguments in this chapter,
one from Taylor and Dennett,  and another one from David Lewis;  I  pointed out  some similarities
between these two arguments and I believe that both of these two arguments have shifted the burdens
of proof to the incompatibilsits’s camp.
After addressing all these problems, I think I’ve quite successfully supported my own thesis, which is
to defend the conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire. 
My thesis is certainly not just an overview of some of the problems this version of conditional analysis
of CHDO faces; I have put these problems together, because I believe by demonstrating that these
problems do no really pose a threat to this version of conditional analysis of freedom, we can say
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confidently that the conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire does actually have lots
of convincing power. 
As far as I know, nobody wrote a paper like I did; nobody had put these problems together and by
replying them to defend a single thesis. Some people argue that conditional analysis of CHDO fails and
some of them modify conditional analysis of freedom into something very complicated. I kept a simple
formulation “I would have done otherwise if I had desired to”, at the same time, I was proposing that
conditional analysts should make it explicit what they have presupposed in this simple formulation. 
Not many theorists, when talking about conditional analysis, consider the “possible world argument”
and the “divergence miracle argument”; I have put them together with the previous discussion, because
I  believe  these  two  arguments  have  strengthen  the  position  of  compatibilists  who  advocate  the
conditional analysis of CHDO.  As I was inspired by Taylor and Dennett’s “possible world argument”,
I hope to do more research on the possible worlds semantics of talking about conditional analysis, and I
would like to bridge the concept of possible worlds and the concept of free will more closely. 
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Abstract
I’m taking a compatiblist position between free will and determinism. I’m mainly discussing “could
have done otherwise” (abbreviated as CHDO throughout my thesis) in the free will debate. My thesis is
that conditional interpretation of CHDO with an antecedent of desire is  a convincing analysis  that
makes CHDO and determinism compatible with each other. I will support this thesis by discussing why
the  antecedent  of  desire  is  a  better  candidate  than  other  antecedents  and replying to  some of  the
criticism against this version of conditional analysis. 
One  conception  of  conditional  analysis  of  CHDO is  that  it  is  a  watered-down  version  of  modal
interpretation  of  CHDO.  I  will  consider  some  arguments  which  give  us  some  new  interesting
perspective  on  the  conditional  interpretation  of  CHDO.  I  believe  that  these  arguements  have
successfully shifted the burden of proof to the incompatiblists  and further increase the convincing
power of the conditional analysis of CHDO with an antecedent of desire. 
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